There has been increasing interest in developing simulation models capable of analyzing commercial aircraft-cabin egress under both non-lifethreatening and life-threatening scenarios. At issue is the ability to accurately simulate human behavior within non-toxic environments, as well as the debilitating effects that toxic environments (e.g., fire and smoke) have on human-decision making. A set of criteria has been identified by the Federal Aviation Administration for developing simulation models capable of analyzing commercial aircraft-cabin egress. These criteria are used to (a) compare the capabilities and limitations of four aircraft-evacuation models in existence today, (b) identify the issues that need to be addressed when developing these types of models, and (c) propose a new paradigm for developing aircraft-cabin egress models.
Introduction
Manufacturers of new passenger (commercial) aircraft, and certain modified-passenger aircraft (e.g., an increased number of rows to the original cabin design) are required to show compliance with 14 4 ,000 people, and requires three years of planning [1] . The costs rise exponentially if the manufacturer is not successful on the first certification test (recall, the test must be conducted until airworthiness is achieved and each test requires a new set of passengers and crew).
Adding to the monetary cost of every certification test is the risk of injuries to the human-test subjects (i.e., the passengers and crew). Thus, the requirement to use children during certification tests was eliminated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1970. However, passengers subject to the highest risk of injury have been women over the age of 50 [1] .
For example, in October 1991, a 65-year-old woman tripped at the aircraft exit of an MD-11. After falling headfirst down an escape slide, she suffered a broken neck and was left paralyzed [2] . Due to this and other injuries, the FAA allowed modifications to The 90 Second Rule. The manufacturer (McDonnell Douglas Aircraft) was allowed to (a) use ramps rather than slides, and (b) increase exterior illumination. When the manufacturer used the ramps and increased exterior illumination, there was a time penalty of 28 seconds imposed on the second certification test. So rather than having 90 seconds to complete the evacuation, the evacuation had be completed within 62 seconds. The penalty was based on observing past certification test films where about (a) 15 seconds was taken by the crew to inflate the slide, and (b) 13 seconds in total hesitation time was realized at the slide (i.e., passengers hesitated before jumping down a slide, but did not hesitate when running onto the ramp) [2] .
Consequently, there has been increasing pressure to improve certification tests' safety, even if the resulting tests give up some realism [3, 4] . Nevertheless, there is one realism that certification tests 
air-EXODUS
EXODUS is a suite of evacuation models currently being developed at the University of Greenwich. In its infancy, EXODUS was used to simulate the evacuation of large populations of individuals from mass transit vehicles (e.g., trains and ships) and from buildings (e.g., cinemas and lecture halls) [12] . The Figure 4 and described below [12, Actor-centered description [14] 2. OOP yields a one-to-one correspondence with the physical world and, thus, eases the burden of model validation.
In 1988, Burns and Morgeson [14] published a construct for simulating systems involving endogenous decision making that draws upon an object-oriented paradigm. Their work proposes describing the system in terms of a suite of actor classes (collection of object classes) whose endogenous decisions impact the performance and behavior of the system. They suggest a model where all actors, including pseudo-actors (environment), follow an actor-centered description (Figure 5 Burns and Morgeson [14] is not a pure object-oriented paradigm, since knowledge bases (production rules and heuristics) and inference engines are utilized for achieving cognitive activity. This approach would equate to developing data, knowledge, and method structures for each actor (passenger) and pseudo-actor (environment). Hence, the danger of adopting this approach is the possibility that the objective of supporting real-time simulation may not be met.
The proposed framework of Figure 6 incorporates the actor-centered description (for passengers and the crew), but avoids the use of knowledge bases and inference engines by providing a pure object-oriented paradigm. To achieve this pure objected-oriented approach, a new set of class objects must be defined that contains (a) the data describing the environment that the actors need to make decisions, and (b) the ap- Figure 6 is described be- 
